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ROHLFS v. KLEMENHAGEN, LLC: IS IT TIME TO REVISE
MONTANA'S DRAM SHOP ACT?
Ross Sharkey*
I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly every week, readers of Montana newspapers are reminded of
the State's drunk-driving epidemic. Whether the given news article details
sentencing of a repeat DUI offender,' describes the Legislature's most re-
cent proposals to reform drunk-driving laws, 2 or chronicles the effects of a
drunk-driving fatality, 3 the message remains the same: Montana has a prob-
lem with drinking and driving. Indeed, 103 of the State's 229 traffic fatali-
ties in 2008 were alcohol related.4 Of those fatalities, 91 involved a driver
with a blood alcohol content (BAC) over the .08 grams-per-deciliter legal
limit.5
* Thanks to Professor Stacey Gordon for her helpful comments and to my wife Lyndsey for her
suggestions and support.
1. See e.g. Associated Press, Billings Man Convicted of Eighth DUI Gets Seven Years in Prison,
Missoulian, http://www.missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/articleae7554de-94bl-1 lde-9a83-
00lcc4c002e0.html (posted Aug. 29, 2009).
2. See e.g. Jennifer McKee, Montana Lawmakers Work on Bills to Crack Down on Drunk Driving,
Missoulian, http://www.missoulian.comlnews/state-and-regional/article_58957cd6-41ba-I ldf-a4d7-
001cc4c03286.html (posted Apr. 6, 2010).
3. See e.g. Tristan Scott, Death of Cousins in DUI Crash Felt Throughout Alberton, Billings
Gazette, http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regionallmontana/article_715d4184-2fl 0-i ldf-aa 18-
00lcc4c002e0.html (posted Mar. 14, 2010).
4. Alcohol Alert, Montana Drunk Driving Statistics, http://www.alcoholalert.comdrunk-driving-
statistics-montana.html (last accessed Nov. 11, 2010). The National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration considers a crash alcohol related if "at least one driver or non-occupant (such as a pedestrian or
pedalcyclist) involved in the crash is determined to have had a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .01
gram per deciliter (g/dL) or higher." Id.
5. Id.
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Despite the attention drunk driving and alcohol-related traffic fatalities
have received, Montana law fails to adequately punish drunk drivers and
those who negligently serve them alcohol. For instance, drunk driving is
not a felony until an offender's fourth conviction. 6 Additionally, Montana's
Dram Shop Act, which imposes civil liability on alcohol providers for the
torts of their drunk patrons in certain situations, contains provisions that
unnecessarily limit the ability of injured third parties to recover damages
from negligent alcohol providers. 7
Recently, in Rohlfs v. Klemenhagen, LLC,8 the Montana Supreme
Court upheld the Dram Shop Act's strict 180-day notice requirement
against equal-protection and special-legislation challenges. 9 The decision
denied plaintiff Cary Rohlfs recovery against the defendant tavern that
served Joseph Warren alcohol over an 11-hour period before he injured
Rohlfs in a motor-vehicle accident.' 0 Rohlfs's claim was not denied on its
merits; rather, it was denied because Rohlfs failed to notify the tavern of his
claim within six months of the incident.It
This note argues that the Montana Supreme Court's decision in Rohlfs
was incorrect because the challenged portion of the Dram Shop Act is un-
constitutional special legislation, and the Court's decision will hinder the
State's effort to cure its drunk-driving problem. This note also examines
liquor-liability laws in other jurisdictions and suggests revisions to Mon-
tana's dram-shop liability scheme. Part II of this note discusses the history
of dram-shop liability nationally and in Montana specifically. Part III de-
tails Rohlfs's facts and examines the Montana Supreme Court's majority
opinion, concurring opinion, and three dissenting opinions. Part IV com-
pares the provisions of Montana's Dram Shop Act with similar laws in
other states, identifies flaws in Montana's scheme, and suggests improve-
ments to the Act. Part V concludes the note by calling for legislative ac-
tion.
6. McKee, supra n. 2.
7. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-710 (2009). The Dram Shop Act provides that "[fqurnishing a person
with an alcoholic beverage is not a cause of, or grounds for finding the furnishing person or entity liable
for, injury or damage wholly or partly arising from an event involving the person who consumed the
beverage unless: (a) the consumer was under the legal drinking age and the furnishing person knew that
the consumer was underage or did not make a reasonable attempt to determine the consumer's age; (b)
the consumer was visibly intoxicated; or (c) the furnishing person forced or coerced the consumption or
told the consumer that the beverage contained no alcohol." Id. at § 27-1-710(3).
8. Rohlfs v. Klemenhagen, LLC, 227 P.3d 42 (Mont. 2009).
9. Id. at 50.
10. Id. at 45 (majority), 50 (Morris, J., concurring).
11. Id. at 45 (majority).
Vol. 72
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II. THE HISTORY OF DRAM-SHOP LIABILITY
A. Nationally
Black's Law Dictionary defines dram-shop liability as "[c]ivil liability
of a commercial seller of alcoholic beverages for personal injury caused by
an intoxicated customer." 12 Similar claims against private individuals,
sometimes referred to as social-host liability, are also allowed in many ju-
risdictions and are generally governed by dram-shop laws.13
The development of dram-shop liability can be likened to a pendulum,
shifting back and forth over time, affected both by changing social norms
and technological developments. Early common law did not provide an
individual injured by an intoxicated person with a cause of action against
the alcohol provider under any circumstances. ' 4 Instead, alcohol consump-
tion, rather than its provision, was the proximate cause of a consumer's or
third party's injury.' 5 The injury was considered too remote from the act of
serving alcohol to be foreseeable.' 6
Seeking to encourage temperance in the mid-1800s, numerous states
enacted dram-shop statutes imposing strict civil liability on liquor vendors
for injuries caused by their intoxicated customers. 17 However, many states
repealed their dram-shop statutes after Prohibition ended in 1933.18 The
common-law rule of nonliability remained predominant until the late 1950s,
when courts began permitting negligent-service claims against liquor prov-
iders. 19 Generally, these courts recognized a liquor provider's duty to not
over-serve customers and, in light of drastic increases in automobile travel,
determined that some injuries attributable to a customer's intoxication were
reasonably foreseeable. 20 Subsequently, numerous jurisdictions accepted
this reasoning. 21
By the late 1970s, many state legislatures had adopted dram-shop stat-
utes. Some of the statutes established that liquor providers were liable for
their intoxicated customers' torts.22 Other statutes limited the availability
12. Black's Law Dictionary 568 (Bryan A. Garner, ed., 9th ed., West 2009).
13. Id.
14. Daphne D. Sipes, The Emergence of Civil Liability for Dispensing Alcohol: A Comparative
Study, 8 Rev. Litig. 1, 3 (1988).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 4.
19. Sean A. O'Connor, Last Call: The South Carolina Supreme Court Turns Out the Lights on
First-Party Plaintiffs' Causes of Action against Tavern Owners, 50 S.C. L. Rev. 1095, 1098-1099
(1999).
20. Id. at 1099.
21. Id. at 1100.
22. See e.g. Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 537.053 (West 2010).
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of similar, judicially created claims.23 A number of states that did not pass
dram-shop acts recognized alcohol providers' civil liability based on liquor-
control statutes or common-law principles.2 4  Today, 43 states provide
some kind of redress against negligent providers of alcohol, although the
cause of action is severely limited in many jurisdictions. 25
Since the reinstatement of dram-shop liability in most jurisdictions,
state courts and legislatures have struggled to define its conceptual and
practical boundaries. Some of the most frustrating questions include:
(1) What actions of an alcohol provider are sufficient to establish negligent
service? (2) What is the proper burden of proof in dram-shop actions?
(3) Should intoxicated consumers who injure themselves be able to recover
from the alcohol providers, or should the cause of action only be available
to innocent third parties? (4) How should liability be apportioned between
multiple negligent parties? and (5) Should dram-shop liability extend to so-
cial hosts? Jurisdictions that have enacted dram-shop statutes have devised
various solutions to these difficult questions, but the resulting laws are quite
different in operation.2 6 The intricacies of these laws are addressed in Part
IV.
B. Montana
Unsurprisingly, the development of dram-shop liability in Montana
paralleled its development nationwide. Shortly after Prohibition, the Mon-
tana Legislature passed the State Liquor Control Act, the Montana Beer
23. Id. Dram-shop acts are sometimes classified by their permissive or prohibitive language; about
half of the statutes are worded to create or memorialize a cause of action while the other half restrict or
prohibit one. See Sipes, supra n. 14, at 5.
24. O'Connor, supra n. 19, at 1100. States providing such causes of action often allow a plaintiff
to utilize the negligence per se doctrine to establish liability predicated on the liquor control violation.
Sipes, supra n. 14, at 7.
25. There is no dram-shop liability in Delaware, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Nebraska, South
Dakota, or Virginia. Wright v. Moffitt, 437 A.2d 554 (Del. 1981); Ling v. Jan's Liquors, 703 P.2d 731
(Kan. 1985); La. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.1 (2009); Felder v. Butler, 438 A.2d 494 (Md. 1981); Holmes v.
Circo, 244 N.W.2d 65 (Neb. 1976); S.D. Codified Laws § 35-4-78 (Westlaw current through 2010);
Williamson v. Old Brogue, Inc., 350 S.E.2d 621 (Va. 1986). Wisconsin's statute disclaims all dram-
shop liability, but does provide a small exception in favor of known minors forced or tricked into
consuming alcohol. Wis. Stat. § 125.035 (Westlaw current through 2010).
26. Ten states that were particularly concerned with limiting dram-shop liability have included
some kind of damage cap in their dram-shop laws. Other states refuse to allow exemplary or punitive
damages in dram-shop cases. Similarly, eight states, including Montana, require dram-shop plaintiffs to
give potential defendants notice of their claim within certain time periods. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 30-102 (2009); Idaho Code Ann. § 23-808(5) (2009); Iowa Code Ann. § 123.93 (2009); 28-A Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 2513 (Westlaw current through 2010); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 436.1801(4) (2008);
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 340A.802 (2009); Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-710(6); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 471.565(3) (West 2010). Arizona and Massachusetts require dram-shop plaintiffs to fulfill procedural
requirements after a dram-shop lawsuit is filed. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 4-302 (WL current through end of
the 49th Leg., 9th Spec. Sess.); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 60J (2010).
4
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Act, and the Montana Retail Liquor License Act. 27 In combination, these
acts placed numerous restrictions on the sale of alcoholic beverages, includ-
ing a prohibition on selling alcohol to obviously intoxicated individuals. 2 8
However, none of the acts expressly provided a civil remedy to persons
injured by an alcohol provider's violation of the acts.29
In the 1961 case Nevin v. Carlasco,30 the Montana Supreme Court was
asked to determine whether the liquor-control statutes imposed a legal duty
on alcohol providers and whether a violation of that duty was grounds for a
civil suit.31 Nevin's plaintiff was knocked to the floor of the defendant's
bar as a result of an altercation between two other patrons. 32 She alleged
the bar negligently violated the liquor-control statutes by serving an obvi-
ously intoxicated person.33 The Montana Supreme Court rejected the plain-
tiffs claim, holding that "when damages arise from voluntary intoxication,
the seller of the intoxicant is not liable in tort for the reason that his act is
not the efficient cause of the damage."'34 Rather, the Court stated: "The
proximate cause is the act of him who imbibes the liquor."'35
The Nevin rule was followed until 1986, when the Montana Supreme
Court decided Nehring v. LaCounte.36 Nehring was a wrongful-death-and-
survival action against a tavern that allegedly served a visibly intoxicated
patron who later caused the decedent's death in a motor-vehicle accident.37
Although the Court rejected the plaintiffs argument that violation of the
liquor-control statutes is negligence per se, it did hold that such violations
are relevant in determining whether a defendant's conduct was negligent.38
Ultimately, the Court rejected the "Neanderthal" approach of exempting al-
cohol providers from liability without regard to their own negligence. 39 It
held that "consumption of the alcoholic beverages served, subsequent driv-
ing, and the likelihood of an injury-producing accident are foreseeable in-
tervening acts which do not relieve the tavern operator of liability for negli-
gence." 40
27. Rohlfs, 227 P.3d at 57 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
28. id.
29. Id. at 58.
30. Nevin v. Carlasco, 365 P.2d 637 (Mont. 1961).
31. Id. at 638.
32. Id. at 637.
33. Id. at 638-639.
34. Id. at 639.
35. Id.
36. Nehring v. LaCounte, 712 P.2d 1329 (Mont. 1986), superseded by statute as stated in Rohlfs,
227 P.3d at 46.
37. Id. at 1331.
38. Id. at 1333.
39. Id. at 1335.
40. Id.
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Less than three months after Nehring established dram-shop liability in
Montana, the Legislature acted to severely restrict its application. Nehring
was decided on January 21, 1986.41 The Legislature called a six-day spe-
cial session in March 1986.42 During that session, it passed the Dram Shop
Act, codified at Montana Code Annotated § 27-1-710 and effective on
April 4, 1986.43 The Act's stated purpose is to "set statutory criteria gov-
erning the liability of a person or entity that furnishes an alcoholic beverage
for injury or damage arising from an event involving the person who con-
sumed the beverage." 44 The Act superseded Nehring by providing that a
violation of the liquor-control statutes-except a violation of Montana
Code Annotated § 16-6-305, which prohibits the provision of alcohol to
minors-is not a basis for establishing civil liability.45 Under the Act, a
provider of alcoholic beverages can only be held liable for injuries caused
by a consumer if: (1) the consumer was a minor and the provider either
knew the consumer's age or failed to make a reasonable effort to determine
the consumer's age; (2) the consumer was visibly intoxicated; or (3) the
provider forced or coerced the consumer to drink alcohol, or told the con-
sumer a beverage was non-alcoholic when the provider knew the beverage
contained alcohol.46
A review of legislative history from the 1986 special session offers
insight into the Legislature's motivations for enacting the Dram Shop Act.
The Act was introduced as House Bill 13 to the House Judiciary Committee
on March 25, 1986, and the committee held a hearing on the Bill the fol-
lowing day.47 Representative Dave Brown introduced the Bill by stating
that it "places the responsibility for one's actions back on the individual
where it belongs and from where the Supreme Court chose to take it. ''48
House Bill 13 drew considerable support from tavern owners and li-
quor distributors. Those who testified in favor of the Bill cited rising insur-
ance premiums resulting from the Nehring decision 49 and the importance of
placing responsibility on the consumer as the primary reasons for its pas-
41. Id. at 1329.
42. Rohlfs, 227 P.3d at 62 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
43. Id.
44. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-710(1).
45. Id. at §§ 27-1-710(2), 16-6-305(4).
46. Id. at § 27-1-710(3).
47. Mont. H. Jud. Comm., Hearing on H. 13, Meeting Minutes, 49th Legis., Spec. Sess. II (Mar. 26,
1986).
48. Id. at 1.
49. Representative Budd Gould testified that some liquor stores had the cost of their insurance go
up by 600% because of the uncertain nature of liquor liability. Id. Phil Strope of the Montana Tavern
Association testified that those taverns that were able to afford insurance received coverage with so
many exceptions that it looked like "swiss cheese." Id. at 1-2.
Vol. 72
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sage. 50 There was no testimony in opposition to House Bill 13.5 1 There
were no discussions considering consumer or public safety, and although
the necessity of making consumers accountable for their actions was dis-
cussed at length, there were no countervailing arguments that tavern owners
should also accept responsibility to monitor their customers' consumption.
The House Judiciary Committee unanimously recommended that the Bill
pass. 52
Two days later, the Senate Committee on Business and Industry held a
hearing on House Bill 13. 53 Senator J.D. Lynch introduced the Bill to the
committee by stating that it "simply tries to address a ridiculous ruling of
the Montana Supreme Court... that hardly anyone thinks makes sense."'54
Senator Lynch described Nehring as imposing strict liability on a tavern for
any subsequent injury caused by one of its intoxicated consumers. 55 He
also suggested that the State of Montana could now be held liable for such
an injury because it sold the alcohol to the tavern. 56 Proponents of the Bill
again testified about the rising cost of liquor liability insurance and the need
for consumer responsibility, and Representative Bob Pavlovich ominously
predicted that if tavern owners did not get some relief "the main streets of
Montana were going to be pretty dark."'57 There was no testimony opposing
House Bill 13 in the Senate hearing; the Bill soon passed and was signed
into law. 58
Despite these restrictions, plaintiffs still had some success litigating
dram-shop claims. The most notable of these successes, a $750,000 jury
verdict in Cusenbary v. Mortensen,59 was a driving force behind various
amendments to the Dram Shop Act in 2003.60 Plaintiff Jonathan
Cusenbary, a patron of the Town Tavern in Great Falls, was injured when
James Wells drove a vehicle through the tavern wall. 61 Wells had been
drinking at the Town Tavern before the incident, despite a condition from
an old neck injury that caused him to lose control of his legs when he con-
50. Id. at 1-3.
51. Id. at4.
52. Mont. Sen. Comm. on Bus. & Ind., Hearing on H. 13, Meeting Minutes, 49th Legis., Spec.
Sess. II at 6.
53. Id. at 1.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1. Lynch went on to say: "You can carry it further even yet, as far as the farmer is
concerned, by saying he sold the barley and on and on it goes." Id.
57. Mont. Sen. Comm. on Bus. & Ind., Hearing on H. 13, Meeting Minutes, 49th Legis., Spec.
Sess. U at 4.
58. ld. at 5.
59. Cusenbary v. Mortensen, 987 P.2d 351, 353 (Mont. 1999).
60. See infra nn. 79-81 and accompanying text.
61. Cusenbary, 987 P.2d at 353.
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sumed alcohol. 62 He entered and exited the Town Tavern in a wheelchair
and was assisted out of the bar and helped into his vehicle moments before
the accident. 63 By all accounts, he was very intoxicated at that time.64
Cusenbary sued Glen Mortensen, owner of the Town Tavern, under
the Dram Shop Act, alleging that the Town Tavern's employees were negli-
gent in serving Wells when he was visibly intoxicated and that their negli-
gence was a proximate cause of his injuries. 65 The jury awarded Cusenbary
$750,000.66 Mortensen appealed and argued the district court erred in dis-
missing his proposed jury instruction regarding his intervening, superseding
cause defense and in excluding evidence of subsequent criminal proceed-
ings against Wells.67
The Montana Supreme Court rejected Mortensen's arguments regard-
ing proximate causation and his intervening, superseding cause defense. 68
The Court ruled that an injury from drunk driving is a foreseeable, interven-
ing act that does not relieve an alcohol provider from dram-shop liability. 69
The Court held that the Dram Shop Act imposed a duty on the Town Tav-
ern to refrain from serving Wells when he was visibly intoxicated, regard-
less of his apparent inability to operate a motor vehicle.70 Since Wells'
subsequent drunk driving was reasonably foreseeable, the Court also af-
firmed the district court's refusal to admit evidence of Wells' criminal con-
victions.71
The Cusenbary decision and other dram-shop plaintiffs' victories, to-
gether with the rising cost of liquor-liability insurance, led the Montana
Tavern Association and other potential dram-shop defendants to seek an-
other legislative fix. Senator Joe Tropila of Cascade County introduced
Senate Bill 337 to the 58th Legislature during the 2003 Regular Session.72
As introduced, the Bill sought to: (1) reduce the statute of limitations for
dram-shop claims from three years to two years; (2) allow for evidence of
criminal charges filed against an intoxicated consumer to be introduced at
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Cusenbary, 987 P.2d at 353. Mortensen also argued that the district court erred in allowing
evidence regarding Wells' BAC at the time of the accident and in dismissing his third-party complaint
against Wells and his family. Id. The Legislature addressed all of the issues Mortensen raised on appeal
when it amended the Dram Shop Act in 2003. See infra n. 73 and accompanying text.
68. Cusenbary, 987 P.2d at 358.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 359.
72. Mont. Sen. Comm. on Bus. & Lab., Hearing on Sen. 337, Meeting Minutes, 58th Legis., Reg.
Sess. 2 (Feb. 14, 2003).
Vol. 72
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trial; (3) eliminate the ability of a consumer or his estate to make a dram-
shop claim; (4) cap noneconomic and punitive damages at $250,000; and
(5) permit the jury to consider the consumption of alcohol, in addition to its
provision, when determining the cause of injuries suffered by a plaintiff.73
Senator Tropila introduced the Bill to the Senate Committee on Busi-
ness and Labor by stating: "SB 337 is a bill about responsibility. It pro-
fesses an alcohol licensee's and social host's responsibility to the public and
also the responsibility of adult customers and guests for their own behav-
ior."' 74 Senator Tropila stated the Bill was also about "the timeliness of
making a claim ... so that recollections are reasonably intact and witnesses
still available."'75
Senate Bill 337 drew considerable support from the tavern industry,
the insurance industry, the Montana University System, and the Montana
Chamber of Commerce. 76 In addition to Senator Tropila, 12 individuals
testified in support of the Bill.77 Only Al Smith of the Montana Trial Law-
yers Association testified in opposition to Senate Bill 337.78
Notably, Glen Mortensen, the defendant in Cusenbary, provided
lengthy testimony supporting Senate Bill 337.79 Mortensen testified that
nearly three years lapsed between the accident and the time he received
notice of the lawsuit, and by that time he was "unable to find a lot of people
who were 'players' in the case." 80 Mortensen also testified that the Bill's
remaining provisions would have helped him adequately defend his law-
suit. 81
Although a relatively large number of people testified in support of
Senate Bill 337, much of the testimony lacked substance. 82 Regardless, the
73. Id. at 2-3.
74. Id. at 2. Senator Tropila is a tavern owner and commented that his family had been in the
liquor business for years. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. The University System and Chamber of Commerce supported the Bill because each hosts
events where alcohol is served and thus they could be subject to liability under the Dram Shop Act. Id.
at 4, 7.
77. Mont. Sen. Comm. on Bus. & Lab., Hearing on Sen. 337, at 3-7. Tavern owners from across
the State provided most of the testimony. Id.
78. Id. at 7.
79. Id. at 5-6.
80. Id. at 5. This was a curious assertion considering Mortensen was certainly on notice of facts
potentially establishing dram-shop liability.
81. Id. at 6. Mortensen expressly supported the evidentiary rules contained in Senate Bill 337 as
well as the damage cap.
82. As noted above, the majority of the supporting testimony in front of the Senate Committee on
Business and Labor was presented by tavern owners or their representatives. Mont. Sen. Comm. on
Bus. & Lab., Hearing on Sen. 337, at 3-7. Most of the testimony was arguably self-serving, consisting
of conclusory statements and vague legal arguments regarding the scope of the Dram Shop Act. See
Rohlfs, 227 P.3d at 65-67 (Nelson, J., dissenting). For example, tavern owners Ralph Ferraro and Glen
9
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Senate Committee on Business and Labor passed the Bill by a vote of nine
to zero, 83 and shortly thereafter, the Senate passed the Bill. 84 Similar testi-
mony was presented to the House Committee on Business and Labor.85
Both that Committee and the full House supported the Bill by wide mar-
gins.86 Governor Judy Martz signed the Bill into law on April 24, 2003.87
The enacted law was very similar to Senator Tropila's original propo-
sal.88 Not only did it contain all the protections enumerated in the original
version of Senate Bill 337, but it was also amended to include a provision
requiring all dram-shop plaintiffs to give defendants notice of their intent to
file suit within 180 days from the date the defendant sold to or served the
consumer-tortfeasor. 89 The inclusion of the requirement was first suggested
by Mark Staples of the Montana Tavern Association as an alternative to
shortening the Dram Shop Act's statute of limitations.90 The Bill was sub-
sequently amended to include a notice requirement as well as a shortened
statute of limitations, and both provisions became part of the amended
Dram Shop Act. 91
The 2003 amendments, codified in Montana Code Annotated
§ 27-1-710(4) to (9), placed significant limitations on a plaintiffs ability
to recover under the Dram Shop Act. However, it was not long before a
plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of one these provisions: the 180-
day notice requirement. 92
I. ROiLFS V. KLEMENHAGEN, LLC
A. Facts
Joseph Warren seriously injured Cary Rohlfs in a motor-vehicle acci-
dent around 1:00 a.m. on June 30, 2006.9 3 Warren had been drinking at the
Mortensen who testified in support of the Bill had previously defended dram-shop claims. Mont. Sen.
Comm. on Bus. & Lab., Hearing on Sen. 337, at 4-6.
83. Montana Legislature Detailed Bill Information Sen. 337 (available at http://laws.leg.mt.gov/
laws03/lawO2O3w$.startup, search by SB337).
84. Id.
85. Mont. H. Comm. on Bus. & Lab., Hearing on Sen. 337, Meeting Minutes, 58th Legis., Reg.
Sess.
86. Detailed Bill Information Sen. 337, supra n. 83.
87. Id.
88. 2003 Mont. Laws 1956-1957.
89. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-710(6).
90. Mont. Sen. Comm. on Bus. & Lab., Hearing on Sen. 337 at 7. Mr. Staples suggested that if the
statute of limitations under the Dram Shop Act continued to be three years, the Committee should
consider including a notice provision so "the business could begin notifying and searching for witnesses
and preparing for a possible trial." Id.
91. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-710(6).
92. Rohlfs, 227 P.3d at 45.
93. Id. at 55 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
Vol. 72
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Stumble Inn94 tavern in Victor, Montana, for 11 hours prior to the acci-
dent.95 In fact, Warren only traveled some 200 feet from the Stumble Inn's
parking lot before crashing into Rohlfs's vehicle.96 Montana Highway Pa-
trol officers investigating the accident testified that Warren appeared intoxi-
cated, and fellow Stumble Inn patrons noted that Warren was "obviously
too drunk to drive. '" 97
In July 2007, Rohlfs filed suit against the Stumble Inn under the Dram
Shop Act.98 Rohlfs alleged the tavern was liable for his injuries because its
employees served Warren alcohol while he was visibly intoxicated. 99
Stumble Inn moved to dismiss the complaint based on Rohlfs's failure to
comply with the Dram Shop Act's 180-day notice requirement. 10° Rohlfs
admitted he failed to satisfy the notice requirement but argued his failure
was excusable because that portion of the Dram Shop Act was unconstitu-
tional special legislation' °1 and violated his right to equal protection.
10 2
The district court granted Stumble Inn's motion to dismiss, and Rohlfs ap-
pealed his constitutional claims to the Montana Supreme Court. 10
3
B. The Supreme Court Majority Opinion
A divided Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismis-
sal of Rohlfs's claim. 4 °  It is important to note that Rohlfs's constitutional
attack on the notice requirement was a "facial" rather than an "as-applied"
challenge.' 05 Rohlfs argued the notice requirement unconstitutionally dis-
tinguished dram-shop cases from other negligence cases. 10 6  Despite
Rohlfs's two-pronged attack on the dram-shop notice requirement, the
Court's five competing opinions focused primarily on his special-legislation
claim.
94. Defendant Klemenhagen, LLC does business as the Stumble Inn. Id. at 44 (majority).
95. Id. at 55 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 56.
97. Id.
98. Rohlfs, 227 P.3d at 45 (majority).
99. Id.
100. Id. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-710(6) provides in part: "[a] civil action may not be commenced
under this section against a person who furnished alcohol unless the person bringing the civil action
provides notice of an intent to file the action to the person who furnished the alcohol by certified mail
within 180 days from the date of sale or service."
101. The Montana Constitution provides that "[t]he legislature shall not pass a special or local act
when a general act is, or can be made, applicable." Mont. Const. art. V, § 12.
102. Rohlfs, 227 P.3d at 45. The Montana Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be denied
the equal protection of the laws." Mont. Const. art. II, § 4.
103. Rohlfs, 227 P.3d at 45.
104. Id. at 50.
105. Id. at 45.
106. Id. Rohlfs argued that such a classification violated the Montana Constitution's guarantee of
equal protection and its prohibition on special legislation.
11
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Generally, a law is not special legislation if it operates uniformly on all
persons in like circumstances. 0 7 Conversely, a law is special legislation if
it "confers particular privileges or imposes peculiar disabilities on a class of
persons arbitrarily selected from a large number of persons all of whom
stand in the same relation to the privileges conferred or disabilities im-
posed."'1 8 Laws that protect only a certain class of people are not unconsti-
tutional special laws if the "classification is made upon some natural, intrin-
sic, or constitutional distinction between the persons within the class and
others not embraced within it."' 1 9
A clear example of an unconstitutional special law is provided in State
ex rel. Redman v. Meyers, County Superintendent of Schools.110 The sus-
pect law in Redman provided that all school districts divided by the creation
of a new county under the New County Acts would become joint school
districts."' However, the law did not apply to school districts divided by
the creation of a new county when the county was created by a direct legis-
lative act." 2 Because there was no legitimate reason to differentiate be-
tween the two scenarios, the Montana Supreme Court declared the law un-
constitutional special legislation.' 13
The Rohlfs Court's majority opinion, authored by Justice John Warner,
acknowledged that the Dram Shop Act notice requirement establishes a
class of persons.' 14 However, the Court narrowly defined the class as
"plaintiffs who utilize a statutory scheme to bring an action against a defen-
dant that is not immediately aware it may be held liable."' 1 5 The relevant
inquiry thus became whether or not it was reasonable for the Legislature to
differentiate dram-shop plaintiffs from common-law-negligence plain-
tiffs.11 6 Deferring to the Legislature's judgment, the Court concluded the
distinction was reasonable because of the "special nature of the Dram Shop
Act."' 17 Having limited the established class to persons seeking redress
under the Dram Shop Act, the Court had no problem holding the notice
107. Lowery v. Garfield Co., 208 P.2d 478, 486 (Mont. 1949).
108. Id. at 487 (citing Leuthold v. Brandjord, 47 P.2d 41, 45 (Mont. 1935)).
109. Id. at 486-487.
110. State ex rel. Redman v. Meyers, Co. Superintendent of Schs., 210 P. 1064 (Mont. 1922).
111. Id. at 1065-1066.
112. Id. at 1066.
113. Id. The Court explained that the law was not unconstitutional merely because it was class
legislation. Id. Rather, the law was unconstitutional because the classification was arbitrary; the fa-
vored class (school districts divided by a county created by the New County Acts) did not exhibit any
special quality or attribute making the law necessary. Id.
114. Rohlfs, 227 P.3d at 46.
115. Id. at 47.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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requirement was not special legislation because it operated equally upon
every member of the established class.' 18
The Court employed similarly narrow reasoning to swiftly reject
Rohlfs's equal-protection challenge.1 19 As the Court stated, "[t]he basic
rule of equal protection 'is that persons similarly situated with respect to a
legitimate governmental purpose of the law must receive like treat-
ment.' ""12 0 If two classes of persons are not similarly situated with respect
to a given law, an equal-protection argument cannot be made based on the
law's disparate treatment of the two classes.1 21 However, even a law that
benefits one class of persons over a similarly situated second class of per-
sons does not violate equal protection if it passes judicial scrutiny and oper-
ates equally upon all those within the benefitted class.122
The Court began its analysis by determining that individuals who
make claims under the Dram Shop Act are similarly situated to those who
make general negligence claims. 123 Having reached this initial conclusion,
the Court next had to determine what level of judicial scrutiny to apply in
analyzing the notice requirement.124 Rohlfs argued that strict-scrutiny re-
view was appropriate because the notice requirement had the effect of clos-
ing the courthouse doors to dram-shop plaintiffs who failed to give notice,
in violation Article II, §16 of the Montana Constitution.12 5 However, the
Court noted that the courthouse doors were open to Rohlfs and that they
only closed after he failed to give the required notice within the statutory
period. 126 The Court determined rational-basis scrutiny was appropriate be-
cause the notice requirement did not involve a suspect class or a fundamen-
tal right.' 27
Noting that the Act was intended to benefit potential defendants who
were likely not present at an injury-causing accident, the Court held that the
notice requirement bore a rational relationship to the government's legiti-
mate interest "in establishing rules for the conduct of litigation and in set-
118. Id.
119. Specifically, Rohlfs argued that the notice requirement violated equal protection principles by
imposing an unconstitutional burden on dram-shop plaintiffs that was not imposed on general negli-
gence plaintiffs. Id. at 48.
120. Rohlfs, 227 P.3d at 48 (quoting Oberson v. U.S. Dept. ofAgric., Forest Serv., 171 P.3d 715, 720
(Mont. 2007)).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. Although the Court determined dram-shop plaintiffs and general negligence plaintiffs were
similarly situated, it gave no reason for classifying them separately in the first place.
124. Id.
125. The Montana Constitution provides that "[clourts of justice shall be open to every person, and
speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property, or character." Mont. Const. art 11, § 16.
126. Rohlfs, 227 P.3d at 47.
127. Id. at 49. The Court also concluded that middle-tier scrutiny was inappropriate because the
notice requirement did not involve a discriminatory classification based on sex or illegitimacy. Id.
13
Sharkey: Rohlfs v. Klemenhagen, LLC: Dram Shop Act
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2011
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
ting periods of limitation for particular types of claims."' 28 Since the notice
requirement applied equally to all dram-shop plaintiffs, the Court ultimately
concluded it was constitutional. 129
C. The Opinions of Justices Morris, Leaphart, and Cotter
Justice Brian Morris filed a short concurring opinion.' 30 He agreed
that Rohlfs's facial challenge to the notice requirement was properly dis-
missed. 31 However, he indicated that, in light of the Stumble Inn's actual
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding Rohlfs's injury, he would
have considered an "as-applied" challenge to the notice requirement. 132
Justice William Leaphart filed a short dissenting opinion in which he
too addressed Stumble Inn's immediate knowledge of Rohlfs's injury. Ac-
cording to Justice Leaphart, the purpose of the notice requirement was
served when Stumble Inn acquired such knowledge; thus, requiring Rohlfs
to provide Stumble Inn with further notice would be superfluous. 33 Since
Stumble Inn was not damaged by Rohlfs's failure to provide it with notice
of his claim, Justice Leaphart would not have enforced the notice require-
ment. 1 3
4
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Patricia Cotter provided her view that
the notice requirement was "plainly unconstitutional special legislation" be-
cause there was no evidence showing that a law of general application
could no longer govern dram-shop liability. 135
D. Justice Nelson's Dissent
In a strong dissent, Justice James Nelson called the notice requirement
"quintessential special legislation" and criticized the majority for giving
"mere lip service to the constitutional provisions and then twist[ing] the
provisions to reach the desired conclusion."'' 36 Justice Nelson argued the
relevant class created by the notice requirement was not limited to plaintiffs
suing under the Dram Shop Act; rather, it included "all tort plaintiffs in-
128. Id. at 49-50. The Court cited special periods of limitation for discrimination and medical mal-
practice claims that survived equal protection challenges as further support for its conclusion. Id.
129. Id. at 49. Although Rohlfs argued that the evidence relied on by the Legislature in enacting the
notice requirement was inadequate, the Court refused to question the "wisdom or expediency" of the
notice requirement. Rohlfs, 227 P.3d at 49.
130. Id. at 50 (Morris, J., concurring).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 51 (Leaphart, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. Rohlfs, 227 P.3d at 51-52 (Cotter, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 52 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
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jured by an absent defendant who is unaware of the injury-causing inci-
dent." 137
Justice Nelson made two key points in favor of the latter classification.
First, Justice Nelson reasoned that defendants in dram-shop actions are not
the only defendants who lack notice that their negligence caused an in-
jury.138 Indeed, product manufacturers, snowmobile-area operators, and
slip-and-fall defendants are similarly situated in that they may not be pre-
sent at an injury-causing incident and they may not learn of it until a lawsuit
is filed.139 Since the notice requirement naturally relates to all absent and
unaware defendants, they should all be included in the relevant class for
analyzing Rohlfs's special-legislation challenge.140 Because the notice re-
quirement only benefits dram-shop defendants, burdens dram-shop plain-
tiffs, and does not apply to other similarly situated plaintiffs and defendants,
Justice Nelson argued it was unconstitutional special legislation. 141
Second, Justice Nelson took issue with the majority's assertion that
dram-shop plaintiffs are a class of their own because they utilize a statuto-
rily authorized cause of action.142 Justice Nelson chronicled the history of
dram-shop liability in Montana and concluded that the Dram Shop Act did
not statutorily create dram-shop liability; rather, it limited the cause of ac-
tion created in Nehring.143 Since dram-shop claims are not "statutory"
claims, Justice Nelson concluded it was unreasonable to separately classify
dram-shop litigants because the scope of their cause of action is statutorily
limited.144
Justice Nelson also wrote at length about the insufficiency of evidence
in the legislative record supporting the notice requirement's enactment. 145
Justice Nelson was particularly critical of the testimony offered before the
legislative committees. 146 The primary testimony regarding the necessity of
137. Id. at 70.
138. Id. at 69.
139. Id. at 70.
140. Id.
141. Rohlfs, 227 P.3d at 70 (Nelson, J., dissenting). Justice Nelson admonished the majority for
"defining the class in such a fashion as to yield a self-sustaining classification-i.e., by defining the
class as those who are burdened by the challenged law and then upholding the law because it discrimi-
nates against all of those people 'uniformly and equally' [when Montana] caselaw makes clear that the
relevant class consists of all persons who are similarly situated with respect to the law's purpose ....
Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 61-62, 70.
144. Id. at 71. The Stumble Inn also argued that the 2003 amendments to the Dram Shop Act were
justifiable because of the rapidly increasing cost of liquor-liability insurance. Interestingly, only New
Jersey's dram-shop act mentions the server's difficulty in obtaining liquor-liability insurance as a pri-
mary purpose for the statute's existence. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:22A-2 (2010).
145. Rohlfs, 227 P.3d at 64-66 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 65-66.
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a shorter statute of limitation and notice requirement came from Glen
Mortensen. 47  Although Mortensen told the committees that he was
prejudiced by the disappearance of numerous witnesses during the three-
year period between Cusenbary's injury and the filing of his suit, such alle-
gations never appeared in Mortensen's briefs.1 48 Justice Nelson criticized
Mortensen's statements to the legislative committees as well as statements
of other proponents of Senate Bill 337 as false, misrepresented, or unsub-
stantiated. 149 The complete absence of testimony substantiating the alleg-
edly unique difficulties faced by alcohol providers in locating witnesses and
gathering evidence made the law even more repugnant to Justice Nelson.150
Throughout his opinion, Justice Nelson described the history of Mon-
tana's Dram Shop Act as a series of bills designed to progressively limit the
liability of tavern owners, regardless of their actions.15' He questioned the
policy behind such legislation, especially in light of Montana's "culture and
deadly tradition of alcohol abuse and drunk driving."'152 Recognizing the
high percentage of Montana highway fatalities that are alcohol related, Jus-
tice Nelson urged that bartenders and servers are the first line of defense
against drunk driving and should be held more accountable for their ac-
tions. 153 Absent significant social-policy changes, Justice Nelson ques-
tioned whether the State's efforts to reduce the incidence of drunk driving
and alcohol-related fatalities can ever be successful.1 54
E. Analysis: Montana Needs to Change Its Attitude
toward Alcohol and Its Law
In addition to his well-founded attacks on the majority's questionable
legal conclusions, Justice Nelson's analysis of Montana's drinking culture
and the State's problem with drunk driving is enlightening. Notwithstand-
ing Montana's high incidence of alcohol-related traffic fatalities, 55 many
people accept, or even promote, the notion that drinking and driving is part
147. Id. at 64.
148. Id. Indeed, it would have been ridiculous for Mortensen to claim that he was not on notice of
the facts creating his potential liability considering Cusenbary was injured by a vehicle that crashed
through the wall of Mortensen's bar.
149. Id. at 67.
150. Id.
151. Rohlfs, 227 P.3d at 57-63 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 72.
153. Id. Justice Nelson stated that "alcohol purveyors need to shoulder their share of responsibility
for the carnage on our highways" and that making tavern owners "less accountable does not encourage
them to be more responsible, as Stumble Inn's conduct on June 29 and 30, 2006, demonstrates." Id.
154. Id.
155. See supra nn. 4-5 and accompanying text.
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of being a Montanan.' 56 Additionally, the tavern industry appears to have
great influence over the State Legislature.157 The combination of these two
factors has caused the Legislature to protect alcohol providers and pass a
number of laws without giving proper consideration to the State's increas-
ing drunk-driving problems. Addressing such problems should become a
true priority for lawmakers, and the Legislature should amend the Dram
Shop Act accordingly.
Dram-shop liability exists for incidents like the one that occurred
outside the Stumble Inn on January 30, 2006. Stumble Inn's employees
served Joseph Warren alcohol for 11 hours and then allowed him to exit the
bar, get in his car, and drive away. He made it less than 200 feet before
crashing into and injuring Cary Rohlfs. It is undisputed that Stumble Inn
employees served Warren when he was visibly intoxicated and that his in-
toxication caused Rohlfs's injury. Absent application of the notice require-
ment, the Stumble Inn would clearly be liable under the Dram Shop Act.
The most frustrating part of Rohlfs is that the 180-day notice require-
ment, which was supposedly added to the Dram Shop Act to lessen the
difficulty tavern owners were having locating witnesses and defending
dram-shop litigation, operated as a complete bar to liability.1 58 It is even
more troubling that the passage of the notice requirement can be directly
traced to misleading, self-serving testimony of tavern owners and other in-
terested persons. However, this is not the only time the Legislature has
yielded to the special interests of the tavern industry and failed to give
proper consideration to the State's problem with drunk driving. Legislative
testimony concerning the enactment of Montana's open-container law'
59
further highlights the tavern industry's influence over the State Legislature
and the dangerous attitude some Montana lawmakers have toward drinking
and driving.
The 1998 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century ("TEA-21"),
which provided states over $200 billion in federal highway funding, re-
quired that every state ban the possession of open alcoholic beverages
within the passenger compartment of any vehicle traveling on public
roads. 160 Starting in October 2000, the federal government began diverting
156. See Rohlfs, 227 P.3d at 54 (Nelson, J., dissenting); Kavan Peterson, Drinking and Driving Legal
in Some States, Stateline: St. Policy & Pol., http://www.stateline.orgflive/ViewPage.action?siteNodeld=
136&languageld=l&contentld=15435 (posted May 12, 2003).
157. See supra nn. 49-58, 76-91 and accompanying text.
158. The notice requirement is essentially a condition precedent to establishing liability under the
Dram Shop Act. Failure to comply with it, even if its purpose has been served, forecloses the only cause
of action an injured person has against a negligent provider of alcohol.
159. Mont. Code Ann. § 61-8-460. The open-container law makes it illegal for any person to pos-
sess an open alcoholic beverage in the passenger area of a motor vehicle on a highway.
160. Peterson, supra n. 156.
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a percentage of federal highway funding from construction funds to high-
way-safety funds for states that had not passed an open-container law.161
The percentage of federal highway money transferred between funds in-
creased the longer a state refused to enact an open-container law. 162 Not
until 2005 did states face the prospect of losing federal highway funding for
failing to comply with TEA-21.163
Senator Dale Mahlum presented Senate Bill 39 to the 58th Legislature
in 2003, at a time when Montana had one of the highest rates of alcohol-
related fatalities in the nation. 164 The Bill would have prohibited the pos-
session of an open container of alcohol in the passenger compartments of
vehicles traveling on Montana roads.1 65  Judy Martz, then governor of
Montana, fully supported the Bill, as did the Montana Highway Patrol,
Mothers Against Drunk Driving, and the Montana Anesthesiologists, Or-
thopedic Surgeons, and Neurosurgeons. 166 Because of the highway-con-
struction funding at stake, the Montana Contractors' Association also sup-
ported the Bill. 167
Despite considerable testimony in favor of Senate Bill 39, and little
testimony against it, some members of the Senate Judiciary Committee ex-
pressed their concerns about the enforcement of an open-container law.168
Senator Jerry O'Neil questioned whether the Bill would make it illegal for a
person gathering firewood in the woods to have a beer with lunch in a truck
parked on the side of the road.169 Senator Gary Perry asked whether a per-
son "sleeping it off' on the shoulder could be convicted of an open-
container violation.1 70 Senator Perry also wondered whether the law would
apply to snowmobiles in West Yellowstone or Red Lodge. 171 Other sena-
tors questioned whether it was necessary to prohibit vehicle passengers
from drinking. 172 Notwithstanding these concerns, Senate Bill 39 passed in
the Senate. 173
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Mont. Sen. Jud. Comm., Hearing on Sen. 80, 59th Legis., Reg. Sess. 12 (Jan. 20, 2005).
164. Mont. Sen. Jud. Comm., Hearing on Sen. 39, Meeting Minutes, 58th Legis., Reg. Sess. 2-3
(Jan. 8, 2003); Peterson, supra n. 156.
165. Mont. Sen. Jud. Comm., Hearing on Sen. 39, Meeting Minutes, 58th Legis., Reg. Sess. at 2.
166. Id.
167. Id. Because of the Bill's divergent support, about half of the legislative testimony in favor of
passing the Bill concerned highway funding and the other half addressed reducing alcohol-related deaths
on Montana highways.
168. Id. at 8-14.
169. Id. at 11.
170. Id. at 13.
171. Sen. Jud. Comm., Hearing on Sen. 39, Meeting Minutes, 58th Legis., Reg. Sess. at 13.
172. Id.
173. Montana Legislature Detailed Bill Information Sen. 39 (available at http://laws.leg.mt.gov/
laws03/lawO2O3w$.startup, search by SB39).
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Governor Martz personally introduced the Bill to the House Judiciary
Committee on March 14, 2003.174 She stated that the open-container law
would address the State's problem with drunk driving and that it would
keep $5.6 million in the highway-construction fund.1 75 Unlike at the Senate
hearing, Mark Staples of the Montana Tavern Association and Christy
Blazer of the Montana Beer and Wine Wholesalers Association testified in
opposition to Senate Bill 39. 176 Each stated that the open-container law
would not address the State's problem with drinking and driving., 77 Brad
Gerrity, a bartender at the Overland Express Lounge in Helena, closed the
testimony against Senate Bill 39 by stating: "[Tihe mountains are high, the
valleys are low, and the city is far, far away."1 78 Shortly after the hearing,
the Bill was voted down. 179 At that time, Montana was one of only two
states without any law restricting the consumption or possession of alcohol
within a moving vehicle.' 80
Two years later, the open-container bill was reintroduced as Senate
Bill 80.181 If the Bill had not passed in 2005, Montana would have lost
around six-million dollars in highway funding.' 82 The Bill received signifi-
cant support and was touted as a "cultural change for the residents of the
State."1 83 The Montana Beer and Wine Wholesalers Association even sup-
ported the Bill, acknowledging that the "political writing was on the
wall." ' 84 The Bill passed the Senate after members of the Judiciary Com-
mittee were assured that "the bill they had in front of them was as basic as it
could be made to make it compliant [with TEA-21]."' 85
The Legislature should not struggle so mightily to pass laws that can
potentially reduce alcohol-related highway fatalities; nor should it be so
quick to pass a law that hinders tort recovery for the victims of drunk driv-
ing. It is time for Montana lawmakers to stop protecting alcohol providers
and focus on solving the State's drinking and driving problems. Currently,
the Legislature is working to address Montana's "culture and deadly tradi-
174. Mont. H. Jud. Comm., Hearing on Sen. 39, Meeting Minutes, 58th Legis., Reg. Sess.
175. Id. at 1. According to Governor Martz, 42 jobs are provided for every million dollars in the
highway construction fund.
176. Id. at 3.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Detailed Bill Information Sen. 39, supra n. 173.
180. Peterson, supra n. 156.
181. Mont. Sen. Jud. Comm., Hearing on Sen. 80, 59th Legis., Reg. Sess. at 1.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 3. The statement was made by Don Hargrove who was representing the Montana Addic-
tive Services Providers. Id.
184. Id. at 4.
185. Id. at 9.
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tion of alcohol abuse and drunk driving."' 86 Yet, as Justice Nelson noted,
"one of the factors contributing to this problem is staring lawmakers in the
face: alcoholic beverages are still being sold or furnished to underage and
visibly intoxicated consumers."' 87 The narrow scope of liability under
Montana's Dram Shop Act imposes a correspondingly narrow responsibil-
ity on alcohol providers to refrain from serving their visibly intoxicated
patrons, and the Act should be revised to ensure negligent servers are held
accountable for their actions.
While some statutory restrictions on dram-shop liability may be pru-
dent, the Legislature should tailor such restrictions to either deal with spe-
cific, narrowly defined issues, or provide relief provisions to avoid the elim-
ination of meritorious claims. Ideally, the strength and reasoning of Justice
Nelson's dissenting opinion, together with his vivid description of Mon-
tana's troubles with drunk driving and alcohol-related fatalities, will trigger
some kind of reform. Since rehearing was denied in Rohlfs on March 23,
2010,188 such change will likely need to come from the Legislature. In
considering revisions to the Dram Shop Act, the Legislature should take
note of dram-shop laws in other jurisdictions.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON THE LAWS OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A. Dram-Shop Laws in Other Jurisdictions
Although most dram-shop laws contain largely similar provisions, sub-
tle variations in language can significantly affect their coverage. For in-
stance, dram-shop laws in most states forbid the sale of liquor to an individ-
ual displaying some type of visible intoxication.1 89 However, the requisite
level of visible intoxication varies from merely "intoxicated"'' 90 to "physi-
cally incapacitated." 19' Clearly, a dram-shop plaintiff is much more likely
to establish that a consumer was intoxicated than physically incapaci-
tated. 92
186. Rohlfs, 227 P.3d at 72 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
187. Id. Justice Nelson continued: "Those who do should be held accountable for such conduct, but
instead they are allowed to hide behind legislatively conferred special protections ..... Id.
188. Interestingly, Justice Warner, author of the Rohlfs majority opinion, resigned from the Court
effective December 31, 2009 and thus did not vote on Rohlfs's motion for rehearing. His replacement,
Associate Justice Mike Wheat, also did not partake in the vote. id.
189. See e.g. Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-10-102(2) (2009).
190. See e.g. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507-F:4 (2009).
191. See e.g. W. Va. Code R. § 60-7-12 (Westlaw current through 2010).
192. Other standards include: "obviously intoxicated," "clearly intoxicated," "visibly intoxicated,"
"drunk," "habitually addicted," "noticeably intoxicated," and "apparently intoxicated." Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 4-311 (West 2010); Ark. Code Ann. §16-126-104 (Westlaw current through 2011); Tenn. Code
Ann. § 57-10-102 (2009); Alaska Stat. § 04.21.020 (Westlaw current through 2011); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 768.125 (Westlaw current through 2011); Ga. Code Ann. § 51-1-40 (Westlaw current through 2011);
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A little more than half of jurisdictions disallow first-party dram-shop
claims and only extend a cause of action to third parties injured by an intox-
icated person. 193 Some of these jurisdictions further limit third-party claims
to persons who did not contribute to or were unaware of the consumer's
intoxication.' 94 Of the jurisdictions that allow some types of first-party
dram-shop claims, most limit first-party liability to providers who know-
ingly served minors or served minors without making a reasonable attempt
to determine their age.' 95 Additionally, about half of all jurisdictions with
dram-shop liability extend it beyond licensed alcohol providers and impose
it on social hosts as well. t96
Eight states, including Montana, have some kind of notice requirement
in their dram-shop acts.197 However, only Montana and Idaho do not pro-
vide some kind of relief from their notice requirements. 198 The Colorado,
Iowa, Maine, and Oregon dram-shop acts all extend the time granted under
their notice requirements for a wrongful-death action, the plaintiffs inca-
pacitation, or the plaintiff s inability to reasonably discover the alcohol pro-
vider's identity. 99 Michigan and Minnesota's dram-shop statutes toll the
notice requirement until the plaintiff hires an attorney to prosecute his
dram-shop claim.2° Additionally, the Minnesota statute excuses a plain-
tiff s failure to provide notice if the alcohol provider has actual notice of the
facts surrounding the plaintiffs injury.20'
States also use a number of techniques to limit the amount of recover-
able damages under their respective dram-shop acts. Eight states, including
Montana,202 have implemented a damages cap. These caps range from
New Mexico's allowance of $50,000 for personal injury and $20,000 for
property damage203 to Utah's $2 million-aggregate-damage cap. 2°4 Some
jurisdictions limit liability by excluding recovery of punitive or exemplary
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 7 § 501 (2010). Other statutes go a step further and provide a standard for proving
visible intoxication. For instance, Oregon requires proof by clear and convincing evidence. Or. Rev.
Stat. § 471.565(2). Tennessee requires a plaintiff to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his injury was
a direct result of the defendant's negligent service.
193. See generally O'Connor, supra n.19.
194. See e.g. Or. Rev. Stat. § 471.565(2)(b).
195. See e.g. Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 537.053(4).
196. See e.g. N.D. Cent. Code § 5-01-06.1 (Westlaw current through 2010).
197. See supra n. 26.
198. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-710(6); Idaho Code Ann. § 23-808.
199. Or. Rev. Stat. § 471.565(4); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 2513; Iowa Code Ann. § 123.93; Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 30-102.
200. Mich. Comp. Laws § 436.1801(4); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 340A.802(2).
201. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 340A.802(2).
202. In Montana, noneconomic damages may not exceed $250,000 and punitive damages may not
exceed $250,000. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-710(7)-(8).
203. N.M. Stat. § 41-1-11 (Westlaw current through 2010).
204. Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14a-101(6) (2009).
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damages in dram-shop actions.20 5 Other states have unique comparative-
negligence provisions written into their statutes. For instance, under New
Jersey's dram-shop act, a licensed alcoholic-beverage server cannot be re-
sponsible for "more than that percentage share of the damages which is
equal to the percentage of negligence attributable to the server or other
party. °206 New Hampshire allows taverns to prove as an affirmative de-
fense that they instituted responsible business practices in serving their cus-
tomers. 207 While these examples are not exhaustive, they represent the va-
rious techniques jurisdictions use to alter or limit dram-shop liability.
B. Recommendations
If the Montana Legislature desires to fairly limit dram-shop liability, it
should revise the Dram Shop Act to include a number of the provisions
discussed above. While completely restructuring the Dram Shop Act 20 8
may be tempting, and even prudent, the Legislature's immediate focus
should be on relieving dram-shop plaintiffs from the harsh effects of the
notice requirement identified in Rohlfs. Such revisions would significantly
reduce the possibility that the notice requirement could bar an otherwise
legitimate dram-shop claim while ensuring that consumers remain responsi-
ble for their actions.
Removing the notice requirement from the Dram Shop Act would
surely solve the problem. However, if the Legislature is genuinely con-
cerned about disappearing evidence and witnesses in dram-shop cases, the
Dram Shop Act should provide relief from the notice requirement to poten-
tial plaintiffs who are legitimately unable to give notice, The Dram Shop
Act should be amended to toll the notice requirement for the period of time
that a plaintiff is unable to give notice because of injury. The notice re-
quirement should also be tolled until the plaintiff has had a reasonable op-
portunity to discover the alcohol server's identity. In lieu of these two
amendments, the 180-day period within which notice must be given should
begin on the day the plaintiff hires an attorney to pursue his rights under the
Dram Shop Act. Either method would provide alcohol servers with ad-
vance notice in most situations while preserving meritorious claims.
Additionally, Montana's Dram Shop Act should provide an exception
to the notice requirement for plaintiffs who can prove the defendant was on
notice of sufficient facts to establish a possible dram-shop claim prior to the
expiration of the 180-day period. In such circumstances, defendants would
205. See e.g. id. at § 32A-14a-101(l)(a)(i)(A).
206. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:22a-6.
207. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507-F:6.
208. Perhaps instituting a comparative-negligence regime similar to the New Jersey dram-shop stat-
ute would be a reasonable way to apportion dram-shop liability.
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still be able to collect and preserve evidence, and plaintiffs would still be
able to pursue their claims. One thing is certain: the current notice require-
ment arbitrarily eliminates viable dram-shop claims and is not a just way to
limit liability.
V. CONCLUSION
The Montana Supreme Court erred in Rohlfs when it upheld the consti-
tutionality of the notice requirement contained in Montana's Dram Shop
Act. Perhaps as important, the facts of Rohlfs reveal a number of deficien-
cies in Montana's dram-shop liability scheme. Rather than fulfilling its in-
tended purpose of preserving evidence in dram-shop cases, the notice re-
quirement eliminated Cary Rohlfs's meritorious cause of action against the
Stumble Inn despite the fact the owners knew about the crash, the injury,
and that a consumer they had served was responsible. Without an amend-
ment providing some kind of relief to dram-shop plaintiffs, the miscarriage
of justice in Rohlfs will likely be duplicated.
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